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Abstract 
Labour’s 2017 general election manifesto contained a pledge to ‘end the punitive 
sanctions regime’ in the British welfare state.  Whilst the specific implications of this 
pledge were not elaborated, such a policy would nevertheless constitute a profound break 
with a welfare consensus spanning over twenty years.  The depth of the suggested 
changes on welfare are also evident in the scale of reform proposed to disability benefits, 
as well as plans – confirmed in August 2018 by the Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell 
– to pilot universal basic income.  Collectively, these policies would seemingly be deeply 
at odds with public opinion on the benefits system, which over the course of the last two 
decades has significantly hardened.  Yet despite the seemingly radical and controversial 
nature of the policy, it received very little media or public attention during the election 
campaign.  This article explores Labour’s ‘quiet revolution’ on welfare, examining 
whether Labour’s new welfare approach is indeed a bold attempt to reshape public 
opinion on welfare or, alternatively, a mostly pragmatic reaction to changing social 
attitudes.  The argument presented is that whilst there are persuasive explanations that 
Labour is responding to a change in the public mood, there is also evidence of a more 
ambitious goal at stake: the aim of reshaping, not simply responding to, public opinion 
on the welfare state. 
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Introduction 
The June 2017 snap general election delivered a result that few predicted when the 
election was first called.  From early opinion polls suggesting a 20 per cent lead for the 
Conservatives, the final vote gave Theresa May a victory of just 2.4 per cent and, now 
infamously, a hung parliament.  The election saw Jeremy Corbyn lead Labour to a near 
10 per cent rise in its vote share: from 30.4 per cent in 2015 to 40 per cent just two years 
later.  For many people this was a remarkable result given the leftward shift and the 
pervading conventional wisdom that the Labour Party could not do well on a more left-
wing platform.1 
 
The Labour manifesto contained a range of more radical policies compared to recent 
general elections.  These included the abolition of university tuition fees, water 
nationalisation and increased rates of income tax for higher earners.  Social security 
proposals were similarly radical.  Labour proposed abolishing some of the post-2010 
welfare reforms, including the Spare Room Subsidy (the ‘Bedroom Tax’) and the removal 
of Housing Benefit for young people.  Significant changes were also pledged to Universal 
Credit. 
 
Most starkly however, the 2017 manifesto made multiple references to ‘end the punitive 
sanctions regime’ for benefit recipients.  The specifics of the pledge were unclear, yet the 
message to the electorate was that Labour intended to roll back some of the 
conditionality introduced by the Conservative, Coalition and New Labour governments. 
In addition, Labour proposed radical changes to disability benefits (including a ‘new 
sanctions regime’ altogether) and has recently pledged to pilot universal basic income 
(UBI), an unconditional, universal guaranteed income.  Amidst a glut of radical and 
purportedly controversial policies, the proposed reform of benefit sanctions have gone 
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largely under the public and media radar.  Yet ending, or even reforming, welfare 
sanctions would constitute a profound break with over two decades of UK social 
security policy. 
 
With the Left of Labour now firmly placed in positions of power within the party, and 
post-election opinion polls showing continued high support for the party, it is an apt 
time to explore Labour’s ‘quiet revolution’ on welfare.  This article examines the policy 
and political context of welfare sanctions, with a particular emphasis on Labour’s policy 
repositioning since 2017.  The main question is whether this repositioning represents a 
genuine challenge to public opinion or, rather, a more pragmatic reaction to changing 
social attitudes on welfare.  Whilst evidence is found for the latter, the article puts 
forward the argument that ultimately Labour is forging a new social policy approach 
compared to the recent decades: rather than following public opinion on welfare, it 
appears that Labour is attempting the purportedly more risky strategy of changing what 
people think.  The article concludes however that transforming social attitudes to welfare 
might not be as risky as commonly perceived.  For evidence that politicians can change 
public opinion on welfare quickly, dramatically and successfully, the contemporary 
Labour Party could look to an unlikely inspiration: New Labour in the late 1990s. 
 
The Politics of Conditionality 
Some degree of conditionality has long been part of the UK social security system, yet 
the present, more intensified, system can be dated to the Conservative reforms of the 
mid-1990s.  These were initially targeted at unemployed people with the introduction of 
Jobseeker’s Allowance and varying requirements and expectations on claimants to look 
for work and engage with job search support.  The New Labour governments 
enthusiastically continued this trend, integrating conditionality firmly within its flagship 
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welfare-to-work New Deal programmes.  During the latter stages of the New Labour era, 
conditionality was controversially extended to other out-of-work groups, specifically lone 
parents and disabled people, although the application of sanctions was relatively rare 
compared to their use by the Conservative-led governments from 2010, who have 
enthusiastically continued and expanded the approach set out by New Labour (despite 
refrains from David Cameron that Labour were the ‘party of unlimited welfare).  The 
number of welfare sanctions issued expanded rapidly during the Coalition government 
and conditionality was extended further, including to those in paid employment under 
the new Universal Credit arrangements.  The shift towards a highly conditional welfare 
state in the UK – within a broader a system of labour market ‘activation’ – is part of a 
global trend in advanced welfare states, albeit with varying levels and degrees of change. 
 
New Labour had a central role in establishing conditionality as a cornerstone of the UK 
social security system, seeing it as a fundamental part of its Third Way between 
Thatcherism and post-war social democracy.  Conditionality was based on the principle 
that benefit claimants would receive support from the state, in the form of services and 
benefits, but in return would be expected to search for and, if offered, accept paid work.  
This quid pro quo – of rights and responsibilities for both the state and the claimant – was 
one of the defining features of New Labour’s political philosophy. 
 
But just as with many other totems of the New Labour era, the current Labour 
leadership are threatening to discard conditionality.  This can be seen in three recent 
developments.  First, Labour’s 2017 manifesto promised to ‘end the punitive sanctions 
regime’ in the benefits system.  Whilst the particular policy implications of this pledge 
were unspecified, the broad conclusion must be that a future Labour government would 
bring about significant reform of conditionality for all affected claimants: including 
5 
unemployed people, low-paid workers and lone parents.  Second, Labour has been far 
clearer on the scale and detail of change proposed to disability benefits.  Alongside its 
main manifesto in 2017, Labour published a separate manifesto outlining changes 
affecting disabled people.  As well as raising benefits for certain groups of claimants, the 
disability manifesto pledged to scrap the Work Capability Assessment – the main tool 
used to determine eligibility to particular disability benefits – and introduce a new 
sanctions regime altogether.  Third, over the past few years Labour has shown a strong 
interest in UBI: a universal benefit without any work requirements or means-testing.  
This culminated in August 2018 with the Shadow Chancellor, John McDonnell, pledging 
to include UBI pilots in the next Labour manifesto.2  These proposals give a sense of 
how a future Labour government would change welfare conditionality.  Least radically, 
we could expect significant changes to disability benefits, including the existing sanctions 
regime.  Most radically however, the entire existing social security system could be 
replaced by an unconditional, universal benefit: UBI.  Either way, even the less radical 
option would mark a significant shift in welfare policy. 
 
This approach does not just represent a break between Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party 
and the New Labour governments of Blair and Brown but between Corbyn and his 
predecessor Ed Miliband.  Whilst parts of the British media warned of ‘Red Ed’ and the 
purported threat of socialism3, the more mundane reality was that many of Miliband’s 
policies could be interpreted as quite modest social democratic reforms.  Nowhere was 
this modesty more revealing than in Miliband’s approach to welfare reform.  Cautious of 
apparently tough pubic attitudes on benefit recipients, the 2015 Labour manifesto was 
careful to qualify its offer of a guaranteed job to every young unemployed person with 
the caveat that if they failed to accept it they would lose benefits.  In this sense 
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Miliband’s Labour – for all the media scaremongering around a shift to the Left – fell 
squarely within the rights and responsibilities tradition of Blair and Brown. 
 
Understanding Labour’s Welfare Strategy 
Labour’s recent policy on welfare conditionality thus represents a break with a political 
consensus that spans a quarter of a century and which has been embraced by a variety of 
ideological factions within both Labour and the Conservatives.  However, what makes 
Labour’s challenge to conditionality all the more remarkable is that it seemingly breaks 
with another political tradition of the past two decades: the instinct that politicians must 
follow public opinion rather than try and reshape it. 
 
This was a key explanation for trying to understand the pace and enthusiasm with which 
welfare reforms were implemented over the past ten years: rapid, tough change for 
benefit claimants is what much of the public wanted to see.  Public attitudes to the 
welfare state, and in particular unemployed people, have hardened since the end of the 
1990s and throughout the 2000s and early 2010s.  Between 1994 and 2011, the 
percentage of British Social Attitudes (BSA) respondents who stated that unemployment 
benefits were ‘too high and discourage (unemployed people) from finding jobs’ increased 
from 24.9 per cent to 64.1 per cent.  Labour’s historic association with the welfare state, 
despite the reforms of the 2000s, was also used to explain the scale of its 2015 election 
defeat.  Such was the hostility of the public to the benefits system, Margaret Beckett’s 
report into the 2015 election argued that one of the reasons Labour lost so heavily was 
because it was identified as the ‘party of welfare’.  With this in mind, Labour’s recent 
shift against the welfare consensus of the past two decades looks all the more bold, as 
well as all the more at odds with recent, popular approaches to responding to public 
opinion. 
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There are question marks however over the extent to which Labour’s new approach 
really is at odds with dominant social attitudes or, alternatively, whether its new welfare 
policy is actually in tune with changing public opinion.  In this latter regard, there are 
three arguments that stand out.  The first is that other issues have overtaken social 
security and unemployment as issues of public concern.  Evidence for this comes from 
IPSOS Mori’s long-running Issues Index, which asks respondents to identify what they 
consider to be the most important issues facing the country.  Figure 1 shows how 
unemployment was judged by many to be a key issue between 2011-2013, when around a 
third of people highlighted it as one of the most important issues facing Britain.  
However as the labour market has improved since 2013, the perceived importance of 
unemployment has fallen significantly.  Simultaneously other issues, most notably the EU 
and the NHS, as well as to a lesser extent poverty, have become much more salient in the 
public mind.  Whilst it is unclear that public concern with unemployment causes tougher 
attitudes towards benefit claimants, the high point of concern with unemployment (2011-
2013) did coincide with the high point of public concern with benefit claimants.  
Additionally, the public appear more worried about issues Labour is traditionally seen as 
stronger on, such as poverty and healthcare. The increased concern with issues Labour is 
more trusted on, together with the reduced concern with issues it is less trusted on, may 
have created the space for Labour to be bolder on welfare reform. 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
A second argument for understanding Labour’s new welfare approach is that public 
attitudes to welfare have never been as tough, uncompromising and homogeneous as 
many politicians and academics have thought.  This is argued by Geiger and Meuleman4, 
who contend that whilst welfare attitudes have certainly hardened over the past twenty 
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years, most people’s views about social security are at root ambivalent: people tend to 
have both concerns about the welfare state whilst simultaneously feeling that it has some 
largely positive functions.  Labour’s strategy can in part be seen in this light.  Much of 
Labour’s rhetoric on welfare has focused on groups that people are more likely to 
associate as ‘deserving’ and, as such, where the public are more likely to find the impact 
of welfare reform to be objectionable.  This includes the experiences of many disabled 
people with new disability assessment procedures, as well as the reliance on food banks 
amongst many of the in-work poor. 
 
The third argument for Labour’s new welfare strategy is that the party is not in fact 
boldly opposing dominant public opinion but is rather responding to changes in social 
attitudes.  One of the most recent BSA reports for example shows that there has been a 
rapid fall in perceptions of benefit fraud and manipulation.5  In addition, people are less 
likely to support further cuts to social security benefits than they were a few years ago.  
In 2010, 42 per cent of BSA respondents said that cutting benefits ‘would damage too 
many people’s lives’; by 2017 this had risen to 56 per cent. 
 
The gap between what Labour and Conservative supporters think about the welfare state 
has also been widening in recent years.  This suggests that whilst Labour’s welfare policy 
may look radical from the outside, it is quite in tune and probably well received by those 
who identify with the party.  The belief, for example, that benefits are too low rose from 
9.8 per cent to 14 per cent between 2011 and 2016 amongst those identifying with the 
Conservative Party.  As such, the Conservatives also appear to be responding to the 
softening of welfare attitudes amongst their supporters, pledging ‘no plans for further 
radical welfare reform’ in their 2017 election manifesto.  For Labour identifiers however, 
the corresponding increase was from 26.5 per cent to 44.5 per cent.  Views on benefits 
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thus appear to be softening across the political spectrum yet at a much faster pace for 
those identifying with Labour.   
 
Reshaping or Following Public Opinion? 
So how can Labour’s new welfare approach, as well as the lack of media or public 
reaction, be explained?  After all, since the 2017 general election Labour has put forward 
a policy approach that was widely attributed to the catastrophic election defeat in 2015.  
The above discussion suggests Labour’s apparently radical approach may not be as out of 
tune with public opinion as it initially seems.  On the one hand, public attitudes have 
softened towards welfare and benefit recipients.  This is true of attitudes towards benefit 
spending and is particularly the case for specific groups of claimants, such as disabled 
people.  It may also be true that social attitudes to welfare were never as toxic as 
conventionally thought.   Whilst people are critical of the welfare state they are also able 
to see the good it does, with Labour tapping into these positive associations and avoiding 
more critical ones.  To this we can add the recent public salience of issues like Brexit and 
the NHS.  Voters are less likely to pay attention to welfare and unemployment than they 
were five years ago.  For these reasons it is arguable that Labour is not so much 
confronting as following changing public opinion. 
 
It is important however to keep public opinion on welfare in perspective.  As Table 2 
shows, large numbers of people continue to hold hostile views on benefit claimants and, 
in particular, unemployed people.  Whilst overall views on welfare may be softening, 
especially for particular groups of claimants like disabled people, it remains true that 
many people think benefits are too high, that they discourage work and that in fact most 
people who do not have a job could find one if they really wanted to.  Although several 
years old, the 2012 BSA survey also demonstrates strong support for the principle of 
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welfare conditionality.  A remarkable 85.5 per cent of respondents were in favour of 
requiring unemployed people to carry out unpaid community work in return for benefits.  
In addition, recent research suggests that there is sizeable support for conditionality 
being applied to in-work benefit recipients too.6  Removing conditionality altogether, or 
even diluting it, would still constitute a significant challenge to what many people tend to 
think about the welfare state. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Evidence from the BSA series thus shows large numbers of people continuing to hold 
critical and hostile views on welfare whilst there appears to be extremely strong support 
for the principles of conditionality and sanctioning.  There is consequently a fourth way 
of understanding Labour’s new welfare strategy.  This is that Labour is attempting to do 
what has long been considered on the Left to be both improbable and undesirable: to 
transform public attitudes on welfare.  As Geiger and Meuleman note, the most common 
approach on the Left in recent years has been to argue for accepting public opinion on 
welfare and working with social attitudes, not against them.  This explains Ed Miliband’s 
strategy of offering more support to benefit claimants than the Conservatives would (via 
a job guarantee) but ensuring this support is strictly qualified by conditionality and the 
threat of benefit sanctions.  Unlike Miliband, it would appear that Corbyn’s Labour 
believes public opinion on welfare can be decisively shifted after all. 
 
Transforming public opinion on key policy areas appears an obvious goal for political 
parties.  Yet in reality this constitutes a dramatic change in how British politicians have 
understood and reacted to social attitudes in recent years.  Since New Labour at least, 
there has been a tacit assumption that politicians should follow public opinion rather 
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than try and reshape it: that social attitudes are social facts that are entrenched and must 
be accommodated.  This was exceptionally clear in 2015 shortly after Labour’s general 
election defeat.  Such was the concern with the supposed incongruity between Labour 
and the public on welfare that the interim leader, Harriet Harman, led the party to 
abstain on the Conservatives’ welfare bill, which included controversial plans to limit tax 
credits to two children.  Labour’s policy on welfare has, like most other policy areas, 
shifted decisively to the Left under the new leadership.  However whilst Labour has 
developed more left-wing policies in most policy areas in most since 2015, many of these 
chime with public opinion.  These include relatively popular left-wing policies on 
transport and utilities nationalisation, as well as increased spending on public services.  It 
seems that welfare is unique in the sense that Labour has moved considerably to the Left 
whilst the public has not. 
 
The capacity of political parties however to reshape public opinion may be more 
straightforward and attainable than politicians have commonly thought.  Indeed, in 
emphasising so strongly the responsibilities of benefit claimants to find and accept paid 
work, New Labour itself was hugely successful – albeit perhaps inadvertently – in 
bringing about a major change in welfare attitudes.  Prior to 1997, public opinion on 
welfare was relatively benign.  In the mid-1990s, evidence from the BSA series suggested 
a widespread sympathy with unemployed people.  There was support for the distribution 
of benefits to those in need, a weak tendency to blame joblessness on the unemployed 
themselves and a belief that government should provide a decent standard of living to 
benefit recipients.7  Such was the public backing of the welfare state that Taylor-Gooby 
declared in 1994 that ‘the foundations of public support for the welfare state had never 
been more solid’.8 
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By the early 2000s, the public environment had changed to one much more hostile to the 
welfare state.  As documented above, people were now much more likely to think 
benefits were too high and that most people could find a job if they really wanted one.  
Public support for less spending on the unemployed also rocketed in the mid-2000s.  
Part of this shift can be explained by the economic cycle: the tendency for welfare 
attitudes to harden in times of economic growth and high employment levels.  However, 
tough welfare attitudes persisted in the immediate post-crisis years when unemployment 
was rising.  Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that young people have transformed 
from a broadly pro-welfare group to one that is anti-welfare9 and that the biggest change 
in welfare attitudes occurred amongst Labour Party supporters.10 All three of these 
points are evidence of a more fundamental shift in public opinion in the 2000s, tied to 
the increased use of welfare conditionality and the persistent emphasis on the behaviour 
and responsibility of benefit claimants. 
 
Although the parallel focus on the responsibility of the state to provide more support for 
out-of-work groups was intended to temper the emphasis on the responsibilities of the 
unemployed, the end result was nevertheless a conservative recasting of the public 
imagination on welfare.  New Labour’s policy focus on conditionality was firmly linked 
with a profound transformation in how unemployment, and social security more broadly, 
was viewed.  O’Grady demonstrates the link between New Labour’s rhetoric and 
changing public attitudes by showing how the qualitative nature of political speeches 
about welfare in the House of Commons has changed since the 1980s.11  O’Grady shows 
that in Labour Party speeches, negative depictions of welfare overtook positive 
depictions of welfare before the shift in public opinion occurred; New Labour did not 
respond to changing social attitudes but actively reshaped them.  Over time however, 
New Labour wrongly diagnosed the provenance of hostile welfare attitudes.  Labour 
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assumed that such attitudes were independent of the actions and rhetoric of political 
parties and, in believing this, became terrified to confront a monster of its own making. 
 
The experience of New Labour thus provides convincing evidence that political parties 
can, after all, reshape public opinion: a conclusion that should give confidence to the 
present project of redirecting attitudes in a decidedly more left-wing orientation.  In the 
most radical manifestation of the confidence that it can change public opinion on 
welfare, Labour has recently demonstrated an interest in UBI an unconditional, regular 
payment to all citizens.  In early 2017, the Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell 
established a working group to explore the feasibility of UBI and in the summer of 2018 
McDonnell announced Labour’s plans to include a UBI pilot in its next manifesto.  If 
Labour were to propose a UBI-type scheme, then this would truly test the malleability of 
public opinion on welfare for three key reasons.  First, a UBI would require governments 
to identify significant additional income and, consequently, build public support for 
higher taxes.  Second, UBI would have to address the social norms around welfare 
provision detailed in this article, specifically the importance many citizens place on 
notions of desert, contribution, need and reciprocity: principles at odds with those that 
underpin UBI.  Third, UBI would also need to engage with debates around the 
importance of paid work and the centrality of employment and the work ethic to many 
voters. Whilst there are strong arguments that UBI incentivises paid work, there are 
parallel arguments that UBI will liberate people from the necessity of employment 
altogether. Gaining public support for UBI is not impossible but would require a 
profound shift within these three aspects of public opinion. 
 
Conclusion 
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The Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn has adopted a welfare approach – ending the 
‘punitive sanctions regime’, disability benefit reform and interest in UBI – that seems 
strongly at odds with public opinion on social security.  Yet despite this, these policies 
received little public attention in the 2017 general election.  This article has explored the 
rationale behind this new welfare approach and identified a range of reasons for both its 
inclusion in the manifesto and the lack of attention it has received.  Whilst public 
opinion on welfare appears to be shifting, and attitudes may have never been as toxic as 
commonly assumed, it appears that Labour is thinking the purportedly unthinkable: that 
public attitudes on welfare can be transformed by political parties.  Whilst this has until 
recently represented an unpopular view amongst left-wing politicians, the consequences 
of New Labour’s own welfare approach in the late 1990s should give justification and 
confidence to this new welfare project.  Perhaps inadvertently, New Labour’s policy and 
rhetoric on welfare was effective in profoundly shifting public opinion towards a much 
more critical and hostile perspective on welfare.  Whether Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party 
can achieve something similar, but in the alternative direction, remains to be seen. 
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Figure 1. IPSOS Mori Issues Index, 2007-2017 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Attitudes to Unemployment and Benefits, British Social Attitudes 2016 
 
BSA Question Per cent 
agreeing/agreeing 
strongly with 
statement 
Unemployment benefits are too high and discourage people from 
working 
49.2 
If welfare benefits weren’t so generous people would learn to stand 
on their own two feet 
44.2 
Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really 
wanted one 
57.1 
It is probably/definitely not the government’s responsibility to 
provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed 
39.8 
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